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  • 1
    Book
    Book
    On competition and regulation in health care systems / (2005)
    Frankfurt am Main :Peter Lang,
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    Details
    UID:
    almafu_BV019721623
    Format: X, 170 Seiten : , Diagramme.
    ISBN: 3-631-53527-9 , 0-8204-7682-x
    Series Statement: Finanzwissenschaftliche Schriften Band 112
    Note: Dissertation Freie Universität Berlin 2003
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe ISBN 978-3-631-75167-1
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    QX 700
    Keywords: Gesundheitspolitik ; Wettbewerbspolitik ; Preisregelung ; Gesundheitswesen ; Qualität ; Hochschulschrift ; Hochschulschrift ; Hochschulschrift
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis
    Author information: Nuscheler, Robert 1969-
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    On Competition and Regulation in Health Care Systems (2018)
    Frankfurt a.M. : PH02
    Details
    UID:
    almafu_9958982573302883
    Format: 1 online resource (192 pages) , , EPDF
    Edition: First, New edition.
    ISBN: 9783631751671 , 3631751672
    Series Statement: Finanzwissenschaftliche Schriften ; 112.
    Content: Health care systems are under reform in many countries. This typically involves a shift towards more competition. But still, markets are highly regulated. This study analyzes competition and regulatory measures in four important fields using the modern tools of microeconomic theory and microeconometrics. The book demonstrates how price regulation interacts with the quality of care and shows that non-price competition amongst providers affects the social desirability of a gatekeeping system. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, the conventional wisdom of risk selection by German sickness funds is challenged.
    Note: Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften , Doctoral Thesis , Contents: Monopoly Pricing in the Market for Vaccines - Price Regulation, Physician Density and the Quality of Care - Gatekeeping and Secondary Care Competition - Sickness Fund Competition in the German Public Health Insurance System: Evidence for Risk Selection? , English.
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9783631535271
    Additional Edition: ISBN 3631535279
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.3726/b13723
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    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
    HU Berlin
    FU Berlin
    Charité
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    On Competition and Regulation in Health Care Systems. (2005)
    Frankfurt a.M. :Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften,
    Details
    UID:
    almahu_9949880791502882
    Format: 1 online resource (194 pages)
    Edition: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 9783631751671
    Series Statement: Finanzwissenschaftliche Schriften Series ; v.112
    Note: Cover -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Outline -- 1.2 Characteristics of the health care market -- 1.2.1 Welfare economics and market failures -- 1.2.2 External effects -- 1.2.3 Market transparency and the quality of care -- 1.2.4 Market transparency and health insurance -- 1.2.5 Market power -- 1.3 Communicable diseases and vaccines -- 1.3.1 The vaccination externality and public policy -- 1.3.2 Examples and empirical evidence -- 1.3.3 Monopoly power -- 1.3.4 Contribution of the thesis -- 1.4 Provider payment and incentives -- 1.4.1 A general payment formula -- 1.4.2 Cost sharing -- 1.4.2.1 Cost containment -- 1.4.2.2 Selection incentives -- 1.4.3 Demand inducement -- 1.4.4< -- tab/> -- Non-price competition -- 1.4.5 Reimbursement and incentives in practice -- 1.4.6 Contribution of the thesis -- 1.5 Market transparency and gatekeeping -- 1.5.1 Credence goods and experience goods -- 1.5.2 Market transparency and product differentiation -- 1.5.3 The key position of gatekeepers in health care -- 1.5.4 Contribution of the thesis -- 1.6 Sickness fund competition -- 1.6.1 The benefits of competition -- 1.6.2 Risk selection -- 1.6.2.1 Adverse Selection -- 1.6.2.2 Cream Skimming -- 1.6.2.3 The adverse effects of risk selection -- 1.6.2.4 Empirical evidence -- 1.6.3 Regulatory measures -- 1.6.4 Risk adjustment -- 1.6.5 International experience -- 1.6.6 Contribution of the thesis -- 1.7 Too many trade offs for efficiency -- 2 Monopoly Pricing in the Market for Vaccines -- 2.1 Motivation -- 2.2 The model -- 2.3 Monopoly pricing -- 2.4 Perfect price discrimination -- 2.5 Public policy -- 2.5.1 Price subsidies -- 2.5.2 Mandatory vaccination -- 2.6 Conclusion -- 2.7 Appendix -- 3 Price Regulation, Physician Density and the Quality of Care -- 3.1 Motivation -- 3.2 The model -- 3.3 The non-cooperative equilibrium -- 3.3.1 Quality -- 3.3.2 Location. , 3.3.3 Entry -- 3.4 The first-best optimum -- 3.5 Price regulation and time consistency -- 3.5.1 Two benchmarks and the first-best optimum -- 3.5.2 First-best efficient regulation -- 3.5.3 The second-best optimum -- 3.5.4 Time consistent regulation -- 3.5.5 The median voter equilibrium -- 3.5.6 A numerical example -- 3.6 Price Competition -- 3.7 Reimbursement of physicians in Germany -- 3.8 Conclusion -- 3.9 Appendix -- 4 Gatekeeping and Secondary Care Competition -- 4.1 Motivation -- 4.2 The model -- 4.3 Direct gatekeeping -- 4.3.1 The specialization-quality game -- 4.3.1.1 The demand for secondary care -- 4.3.1.2 Quality competition -- 4.3.1.3 Specialization -- 4.3.2 Social Welfare -- 4.3.2.1 The second-best optimum -- 4.3.2.2 The first-best optimum -- 4.3.3 Gatekeeping -- 4.3.3.1 A numerical example -- 4.3.4 Price regulation -- 4.4 Indirect gatekeeping -- 4.4.1 The specialization-quality game -- 4.4.1.1 The demand for secondary care and GP consultation -- 4.4.1.2 Quality competition and specialization -- 4.4.1.3 The solution of the game -- 4.4.2 Social welfare -- 4.4.3 Price regulation -- 4.5 Conclusion -- 5 Sickness Fund Competition in the German Public Health Insurance System: Evidence for Risk Selection? -- 5.1 Motivation -- 5.2 Risk selection and regulation -- 5.2.1 Active and passive risk selection -- 5.2.2 Regulation of sickness fund competition in Germany -- 5.3 Institutional background -- 5.4 Data -- 5.5 The empirical model -- 5.6 Results -- 5.6.1 Health status -- 5.6.2 Switching behavior of non-BKK members -- 5.6.3 Switching behavior of BKK members -- 5.7 Conclusion -- 5.8 Appendix -- 6 Summary (in German) -- 6.1 Impfungen (Kapitel 2) -- 6.2 Preisregulierung (Kapitel 3) -- 6.3 Hausarztprinzip (Kapitel 4) -- 6.4 Risikoselektion (Kapitel 5).
    Additional Edition: Print version: Nuscheler, Robert On Competition and Regulation in Health Care Systems Frankfurt a.M. : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften,c2005 ISBN 9783631535271
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books. ; Hochschulschrift
    URL: Click to View
    URL: lizenzpflichtig
    URL: kostenfrei
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    Online Resource
    Stabi Berlin
    HU Berlin
    UB Potsdam
  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    On Competition and Regulation in Health Care Systems (2018)
    Frankfurt a.M. : Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften
    Details
    UID:
    almahu_9948168435802882
    Format: 1 online resource
    Edition: 1st, New ed.
    ISBN: 9783631751671
    Series Statement: Finanzwissenschaftliche Schriften 112
    Content: Health care systems are under reform in many countries. This typically involves a shift towards more competition. But still, markets are highly regulated. This study analyzes competition and regulatory measures in four important fields using the modern tools of microeconomic theory and microeconometrics. The book demonstrates how price regulation interacts with the quality of care and shows that non-price competition amongst providers affects the social desirability of a gatekeeping system. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, the conventional wisdom of risk selection by German sickness funds is challenged.
    Note: Doctoral Thesis , Contents: Monopoly Pricing in the Market for Vaccines – Price Regulation, Physician Density and the Quality of Care – Gatekeeping and Secondary Care Competition – Sickness Fund Competition in the German Public Health Insurance System: Evidence for Risk Selection?
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9783631535271
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.3726/b13723
    URL: https://www.peterlang.com/view/product/57553?format=EPDF
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
    HU Berlin
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